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J MAGINEPP.EPARJ.NG TO BECOME A BOOKBINDER.You take 
a professional course in the history and theory of binding. You 
examine historic books, study their design, read what others 
have said about them, see pictures of the tools, even investigate 
the chemical composition of the boards. But in this course you 
never actually bind a book. When you finish the course, though, 
the instructor hands you a piece of paper that says: "Congratula- 
tions, you are now a bookbinder." I imagine you'd ask for your 
money back. 
To our shame, that's how we teach in the legal academy. 
This observation is scarcely original. Fifty years ago,Jerome 
Frank, perhaps the fiercest critic of the conventional case 
method, wrote: "If it were not for a tradition which blinds us, 
would we not consider it ridiculous that ... law schools confine 
their students to what they can learn about litigation in books? 
What would we say of a medical school where students were 
taught surgery solely from the printed page? No one, ifhe could 
do otherwise, would teach the art of playing golf by having the 
teacher talk about golf to the prospective player and having the 
latter read a book relating to the subject. "1 
Frank wanted students to learn by doing, by working in law 
offices, much as medical students learn by working in hospitals. 
I propose something much more modest, and therefore more 
important, because it is at least theoretically possible to 
accomplish what I aim to suggest and develop, with your help: 
teaching how to locate; assess, and draw inferences from facts. 
A few years ago I concluded that something was drastically 
wrong with legal education-perhaps we all come to that con- 
1J erome Frank, "A Plea for Lawyer-Schools," 56 Yale L.]. 1303, 
1311 (1947). 
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clusion sooner or later-and, more, I became convinced that I 
knew the source of the defect: We do not teach or even talk 
about the one thing on which lawyers spend most of their time, 
namely, ferreting out the facts. I began to talk about this 
problem with some of my colleagues, even to the point of 
hosting a lunchtime colloquium two years ago on teaching facts. 
I can confidently state that my enthusiasm for my discovery 
won me no converts. 
I then realized that this problem, framed dramatically as 
"the failure of legal education," would make a dandy chapter in 
a book I have been claiming to be working on for the past ten 
years, on the problem oflawyers in America (with my authorial 
colleague and good friend Tom Goldstein, now dean of the 
Columbia Journalism School). When the opportunity for this 
talk arose, I decided finally to take the plunge and to begin to 
think systematically about this problem of our failure to talk 
about facts. That way I could give this talk and write a chapter 
and have two for the cost of one. 
Almost as an afterthought, I decided I should make a brief 
excursion to the library. I'm old enough now to know that most 
of what I think I have dreamed up has already been voiced by 
others. So I suppose I should not have been surprised to 
discover a literature, albeit a small one, about this very problem. 
It's nearly a century old. It is even denominated by a set of 
initials, though I think these are perhaps only a few decades old: 
EPF, evidence, proof, and facts. 
EPF appears to have started with John H. Wigmore early 
in the century. (I suppose I should say early in the 20th century, 
in case these remarks are actually preserved for another year or 
two.) Wigmore was, no doubt, reacting to the case method of 
teaching that by the beginning of World War I had certainly 
established itself in the American law schools. Wigmore 
proposed that something more was needed, not merely an 
analysis of legal rules, even if from original sources, but an 
analysis of the persuasive power of the facts themselves. Why do 
we accept a statement as fact? What constitutes sufficient 
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evidence? What makes a . datum relevant to an issue? Wigmore 
devised a complex symbolism, with flow charts, that permitted 
the student to map the relationship between facts, and 
testimony about facts, and the likelihood that one assertion or 
another was true and "proved" some ultimate fact.2 
Wigmore, because he was dean of Northwestern, could 
mandate that all students take a course in which he taught how 
to use his symbolic logic to reason with facts and draw 
inferences from them. When he was no longer dean the course 
was no longer required, and when he passed from the scene the 
course was not taught. Episodically during the intervening 
decades, other voices, some of them powerful, have' suggested 
that Wigmore's idea, or something like it, must be revivified. 
About a quarter century ago, clinical courses gained a foothold 
in the legal academy,3 and they may be understood as one 
answer to Wigmore's call. My clinical colleagues tell me that 
fact issues are now taught to some degree, certainly more so 
than in the days when the case method was not merely the 
supreme method but the sole method of teaching. Clinical 
courses focus on pretrial litigation, trial advocacy, "skills" 
courses that teach interviewing (and perhaps negotiation), and 
various "live-client" clinics and subject-related workshops. 
These courses are important. But they are expensive and they do 
not reach very many students. The question I'm posing is whether 
we can do for the curriculum what research and writing courses 
have achieved during the past two decades. Can we design a 
course that will reach every student in the school? 
We need to provide this course because the "case-trained 
lawyer is in danger of having a distorted picture of the world in 
2John H. Wigmore, "The Problem of Proof," 8 Ill L.Rev. 77 
(1913);}0HN H. WI GM ORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF AS 
GIVENBYLOGIC,PSYCHOLOGY,ANDGENERALExPERIENCEAND 
ILLUSTRATEDIN}UDICIAL TRIALS (3rd ed. 1937). 
3Anthony G. Amsterdam, "Clinical Legal Education-a 
21st-Century Perspective," 34]. of'Legal Educ. 612 (1984). 
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which the pathological and the exotic obscure the healthy and 
the routine."4 Mariana Hogan, the New York Law School 
externship director, reports that students sent outto work in law 
offices around New York City commonly complain that they 
rarely do the "real work" oflawyers. What do they do instead? 
Frequently, it seems, they are asked to sort through a file to un- 
cover the facts! Rea/lawyers, they assume, know otherwise. Two 
decades ago, a well-known survey of the Chicago bar reported 
that only two "skills" of the practicing lawyer are really essential: 
"fact gathering" and "the capacity to marshal facts and order 
them so that concepts can be applied. "5 Commenting in the 
early 1990s on this survey, Abraham P. Ordover noted that 
what lawyers "do, day in and day out, is investigate, gather, 
research, assimilate, and understand the relevance of facts. This 
holds true for responses all across the lines of expertise in the 
profession. And yet this fact work is, by and large, not taught in 
our law schools. "6 
Does this inattention to teaching about facts really make a 
difference? A half century ago perhaps it did not: when law 
school admissions were relatively low most young graduates 
received on-the-job training in firms or had the leisure in their 
own shops to learn it for themselves, and there was much less 
law. The difficulties that arise when schools ignore fact analysis 
were less apparent. Today I put it to you that we are verging on 
a crisis: After they graduate nowadays, law students do not get 
the personal training that their forebears received. The firms 
complain about it, the law offices complain about it, and woe 
betide the new solo practitioner who has no idea how to 
uncover or make much of the facts. 
"William Twining, ''Taking Facts Seriously," 34] ofLegalEduc. 
22, 39 (1984). 
5F'RANCES KAHN ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE 
MAKING OF A PuBLIC PROFESSION 124-5 (1981). 
6Abraham P. Ordover, ''Teaching Sensitivity to Facts," 66 Notre 
Dame L.Rev. 813, 814 (1991). 
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We call the places in which we work Law Schools. What 
we really mean is that they are Rules Schools. Law school 
teachers suppose, probably without thinking deeply on it, that 
they are masters of teaching "legal analysis." But what we really 
teach is "rules analysis," not all of analysis. And rules analysis, 
in the final analysis, is only a small part of the enterprise. We do 
it, I think, because it's easy to do. We don't have to get our 
hands dirty. We don't have to go out and look very hard for 
anything. It's all in the library or on line. We find the rules; we 
find articles about the rules; we find other people's ~omments 
about how the rules work or not; and we intuit (we call it 
analyzing) their difficulties. We do not get grimy from 
researching in the real world. 
This was the critique, in part, leveled by the legal realists, 
but most of them went off in the wrong direction, still 
worrying, in the end, about rules and what accounts for them 
and how they are interpreted. The more important question for 
our students is how the rules are to be used. One of the most 
prescient of the realists, Jerome Frank, did worry about this 
question. He described himself as a "fact skeptic, "7 but very few 
people have taken him up on the implications of his claims. 8 
Law schools, in the realists' view, ought to be Schools of Legal 
Problem-Solving, not just Schools of Facts or Schools of Psy- 
chology. I agree but suggest that we need not be so much 
"practice oriented" as "lawyer centered." I'm not concerned 
whether we teach the particular narrow technique ofbrief filing; 
the mechanics of practice are not the issue. But the theory of 
practice, as it were, is the issue. How a person carries out a 
profession ought to be central to our inquiry as teachers in 
schools. That says nothing about what we should engage in as 
7}EROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xi (6th 
printing, 1963 ed.). 
8Robert S. Marx, "Shall Law Schools Establish a Course on 
'Facts?'," 5 J of Legal Educ. 524 (1953); Irvin C. Rutter, "A 
Jurisprudence of Lawyers' Operations," 13 J of Legal Educ. 301 
{1961). 
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scholars on our own. Individual professors should, of course, 
feel free to follow the muse, and hats off if they choose to write 
about economics or sociology or literature and law, or about law 
simpliciter. But when we consider what we are doing peda- 
gogically we must do more and we must do it differently. 
To this point I admit that I have been abstract. What facts? 
What about facts? We frequently bemoan the state of our 
students' knowledge about what we might call "college" facts or 
textbook facts. In constitutional law they demonstrate that they 
do not know how a bill is enacted or what impeachment means. 
In corporations, they do not understand the nature of the 
corporation or the stock it issues. We want students to come to 
law school with grounding in American government, 
economics, and history. We'd like them to know some 
psychology and sociology. Ignorance of these fields hampers 
efforts to learn many branches of law. But we do not seem to 
bemoan a more root ignorance: the ignorance of what the facts 
of the particular case are, or how to find them. At least we know 
where students can learn history and finance: the story of 
"history" may be found in a textbooks. But there are no 
textbooks that can give us the "facts" of the cases we discuss 
beyond the meager statements contained in the casebooks we 
use. Graduate instruction in history presumably teaches the 
budding historian how to find the "facts" that will constitute a 
history: should we not do the same for the budding lawyer? 
Consider an analogy to astronomy. We read that the uni- 
verse is expanding. This "fact" is retailed to lay audiences in 
newspapers and news magazines when an astronomer discovers 
a far distant supernova with an unusual red shift. We are not 
told how the "fact" gets learned. It is not a fact like the fact that 
my car is parked outdoors, because we cannot observe it directly. 
Therefore it is a deduced or inferred fact, a conclusion drawn 
from data. The process of inference isn't given us. It's derived 
from smudges on a photographic plate, or lines of numbers in 
a statistical table generated by a computer. Can you imagine not 
teaching the astronomy student that these are the data bits from 
7 
which the inference to "facts" will become known? Yet that's 
not how we teach our law students. Instead, we ignore how the 
data bits are to be found and largely overlook how they drive 
juries, judges, lawyers, and clients to their conclusions. 
These deficiencies deeply affect us. Let me repeat some 
stories I have heard over the years from a friend who was once 
the director of a legal clinic at a well-known law school. (He 
forbids me from naming it.) One year he decided as an experi- 
ment to staff the clinic in the evening with well-known 
professors at this well-known law school. Here is how the 
professors handled their clients' cases. 
Client 1. The client wanted a divorce. The lawyer-professor 
grilled her extensively about her husband's philandering, 
reducing her to tears. At the debriefing he suggested to my 
friend, the clinic director, that he had given his client sound 
advice about how to shape her pleading, by reciting the ample 
evidence of her husband's infidelities. Unfortunately, it turned 
out the professor-lawyer did not know the law of the state in 
which his law school was located but had in mind instead a 
1920s' statute from a different state to aid him in his interro- 
gation of a 1960s' problem. He had the law wrong, although he 
was doing what a lawyer should be doing. 
Client 2. The client announced that he had to be halfway 
across the state the next morning for a court appearance. The 
professor-lawyer reached into his pocket and handed the client 
$50 and sent him packing. At a debriefing later that evening, 
this second professor wanted to know whether the office would 
refund the $50. He made absolutely no attempt to find out what 
the client's underlying legal problem was. 
Client 3. The client lived in a building where electricity for 
her and a neighbor was billed to her on a single meter. She 
asked the professor-lawyer whether she could be sued if she 
withheld from her rent the amount of her neighbor's electricity. 
The professor said "yes." That was his whole answer. He did 
not ask for the landlord's name or phone number; he had no 
instinct to call the landlord and say "cut it out." He did not ask 
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about what kind of man the landlord was and whether he would 
cave in to pressure. 
What's going on here? We see three characteristic errors of 
lawyer-professors who do not attend to the real job of solving 
a client's problem. The first lawyer had the wrong law. Using 
the right law is what we actually teach in the law schools and his 
was, of course, an elementary error. The second lawyer did not 
bother to ask about the problem. He arrogantly assumed that 
something else was at stake. He did not listen to the client or 
probe at all. He heard what he wanted to hear. This is a deeper 
mistake; one that we rarely dwell on in law school. The third 
lawyer did not derive from the given facts an operational plan. 
He failed to infer the solution from the factual statement. Here 
the professor presumably drew some of the facts out properly, 
but he did not draw them all out, and he did not do anything 
with them. Instead, he answered like a law school professor. He 
was not concerned about being a lawyer but about under- 
standing the theory of the case. 
The approach of these three lawyer-professors is charac- 
teristic, I submit, of the three ways in which we fail to teach 
about facts. First, we think we teach, though we do not do it 
well, that the facts we seek will be determined in no small part 
by the rules that are implicated in the problem. If you have the 
wrong law, as our first professor-lawyer had, then you will look 
for the wrong facts. Second, we do not teach students that it 
will be their job to probe for facts. Except perhaps for the lim- 
ited enrollment clinical course, we do not explain how students 
can dig for pertinent facts. Third, we do not teach students that 
as lawyers they must infer from the facts how to proceed. · 
How can we teach the art of the fact? How can we go 
beyond the standard answer that we already teach the art of the 
fact when we teach, as we claim to do in all our courses, the art 
of analysis? One answer was given by an experimenter at UCLA 
in the early 1950s. A 44-hour summer course consisted of the 
following topics: eyewitness testimony; detection of deception; 
confessions and interrogation methods; "correlation of proof' 
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(we are told to read Commonwealth v. Wentzel, 360 Pa. 137, 
61 A.2d 309 (1948), to make this clear); investigative 
accounting; photographl:c evidence; medico-legal subjects; 
documents; impressions and moulages; ballistics; fingerprints; 
spectrographic analysis; blood chemistry; alcohol effect and 
detection; sound and recording devices; general investigative 
procedures.9 Now there's a potpourri. That's not what I mean 
by a course in facts and fact analysis, though some of the items 
on the list would undoubtedly be considered in any course we 
might devise. What's wrong with this list? The problem is that 
it conceives of the problem of facts as a set of specific tasks and 
techniques rather than as a general issue that cries out for its own 
analysis. 
The issue is the abstraction we call facts that in their 
concrete manifestation permeate everything that lawyers do. 
Mastering the art of tqe fact requires an underlying skill that 
Irvin C. Rutter, a professor at the University of Cincinnati Law 
School, in 1961 called the skillof"factmanagement." As Rutter 
described it, various tasks of lawyers do not amount to different 
skills, but to operations requiring the exercise of the same skill: 
"In ordering the chaos, the lawyer proceeds by discovering rela- 
tionships between initially unrelated segments of the picture 
and then placing these relationships in their further relationship 
to a total reality, so far as it can be seen. "10 Law, in this sense, 
is not a separate reality but a 
part of the total mass of facts, albeit a special kind of 
facts. . . . It is not a denial of the reality of language as a 
prime tool of the lawyer to say that with this intimate 
identification with the facts, the lawyer goes beyond the 
words in which they have been presented to him, penetrates 
to the reality behind those words, and emerges with words 
as he chooses them to describe the reality as he wants others 
9Marshall W. Houts, "A Course in Proof," 7]. of Legal Educ. 418 
(1955). 
10Irvin C. Rutter, "A Jurisprudence of Lawyer's Operations," 13 
]. of Legal Educ. 301, 317 (1961). 
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to see it. Of critical importance in guiding this process of 
selection and molding is that expertness in relevance to the 
purpose sought to be achieved, which is the crux of the "art" 
of being a lawyer." 
Or, as William Twining, one of the most dedicated students of 
the problem, has put it: "[T]he serious study of reasoning in 
regard to disputed matters of fact is at least as important and 
can be at least as intellectually demanding as the study of 
reasoning in respect of disputed questions oflaw. "12 
What, then, might such a course comprise? I tentatively 
suggest some possibilities, perhaps not ordered particularly 
usefully. I hope you will help me add to this laundry list and 
suggest how the laundry list can be transmuted into a complete 
fashion statement. 
First, we must show students how difficult it is to uncover 
facts, and how testimony about an event is a "fact" of a very dif- 
ferent kind. We can do the hoary demonstration, the one that 
sends someone rushing into the classroom and that asks 
students to say immediately what they saw. We can also ask the 
same question a day or a week later. Moreover, we can tape 
these encounters, and students might even realize the taping is 
going on. We might wait to see how long it would take for 
some student to point out that the recollection is unnecessary 
because a tape has captured it all. Of course then we need to 
unearth the "facts" from the tape. 
Second, we should devise means of permitting students to 
efficiently extract facts from a situation. The "live-client" clinics 
do this in an expensive way when each student undertakes to 
interview a witness. But we can easily provide all sorts of canned 
records, transcripts of testimony, documents, police reports, and 
the like, from which the student must sift the relevant and 
material from the useless and redundant. 
11Id. (emphasis in the original). 
12\Villiam Twining, "Taking Facts Seriously," 34] ofLegalEduc. 
22, 37 (1984). 
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Third, we must force students to analyze the nature of facts 
and to learn that facts" are like animals. They come not only in 
different species but in different genuses and families. For 
example, I use a simple exercise in an upperclass writing course 
in which students are told they are assistants to the mayor of a 
particular town. One of the mayor's key assistants has been 
involved in an automobile accident. The assistant is the head of 
the Mayor's Campaign against Drunk Driving, among other 
things. The students are given a file that consists of transcripts 
of an investigator's discussions with each of the witnesses to and 
victims of the accident; the file also contains several newspaper 
accounts of the accident. One of the accounts is' headlined: 
"Drinking and Driving?" The Mayor's instructions are to write 
a memorandum detailing only the facts. The Mayor specifically 
instructs that he does not want to read speculation, rumor, and 
innuendo. Of course: it turns out that the transcripts are full of 
rumor, speculation, and innuendo. Moreover, the witnesses 
disagree on virtually everything. The record is, though, 
definitively devoid of any statements or other evidence that 
anyone had been drinking. The students have great difficulty 
writing this memorandum. They usually keep it very short, and 
predictably write in this form: "Mr. Mayor, Witness 1 says X. 
Witness 2 says Y," etc. Over the years, I have discovered that 
few-less than 10 percent-of the students will tell the mayor 
that there is no evidence of drinking. When I ask in class after the 
papers are turned in why the students omitted this information, 
I am invariably told: "That wasn't a fact." 
Fourth, we must consider the vastly difficult problem of 
assessing and evaluating facts. In this same exercise, students 
almost never tell the mayor that the accident itself was routine, 
though that is the only conclusion that can be drawn. Again, 
students resist, saying that a conclusion is not a fact. Why isn't 
it? What is a conclusion, if not a fact, although a different kind 
of fact from, say, the fact that the cars crashed, or the 
recollection that one car was traveling at 50 miles per hour? 
This issue is either the same as, or closely related to, the 
problems of inference and proo£ I will not detail those 
12 
problems here, but simply point to a current example: How does 
Microsoft's insistence that Internet Explorer be a part of the 
Windows operating system "prove" that the company has vio- 
lated the Sherman Act? What is the connection between 
individual facts that allow them to be added up to a larger truth? 
How are inferences drawn? When are they valid? What kind of 
logic or logics are at work? What is proof, anyway? Is it merely 
the subjective reaction of the decision maker, so that we may 
appeal to his emotions to get a result? Or is it something else, 
and what? 
Fifth, we should find better, more direct, and more 
structured ways of teaching students how the rules they analyze 
are to be used to extract the facts necessary to make the case, to 
avoid a bad result, or to accomplish a particular objective. 
Sixth, we must persuade students that the facts are not 
merely irreducible elements of the universe, but shards and 
flashes of nuance that it is the lawyer's task to assemble into a story 
that will achieve the client's end? This last problem, I hope you 
will agree, is what allows us, as writing teachers, to claim this 
territory for ourselves, and to wrestle with a pedagogy of facts. 
* * * 
There have been powerful objections lodged against the 
suggestions that the EPF adherents and I have made. Twining 
discusses and answers them in his 1984 summary article, 
"Taking Facts Seriously." I will not repeat his listing of the 
arguments and his counterarguments. Most criticisms of a 
proposed "fact syllabus" boil down to the claim that law schools 
have no time to teach "soft" skills or notions rooted in common 
sense that have been learned elsewhere. But these criticisms are 
almost wholly beside the point: They miss the distinction 
between a general skill and a particular practical requirement; 
they underestimate the difficulty inherent in the problem; they 
radically assume common sense for much that has not yet been 
investigated; and they assume without evidence that these 
things have been taught elsewhere. Moreover, the tables can be 
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turned: After all, isn't rule handling a matter, ultimately, of 
common sense? Yet we. spend most of three years on rules 
handling, of detecting, understanding, distinguishing, and 
applying rules. Why should we do less about fact handling? 
To get a flavor of the general objection, consider a short 
article in 1955 by Jack B. Weinstein, then an associate professor 
of law at Columbia. He wrote that there was no need of a 
separate course on facts because this subject was being (or could 
be) taught in its appropriate place in other courses. Weinstein 
pointed to three meanings of "facts skills": (1) "the ability to 
differentiate between facts which are and are not legally 
significant"; (2) "the knowledge of how courses of conduct may 
be planned to shape the material facts"; (3) "an awareness of 
how evidence of the facts may be gathered and used in 
litigation. "13 
On the first point He said: "Teaching a law student brought 
up on the case method the importance of differentiating the 
material from the immaterial would seem to be about as 
unnecessary as teaching an infant the importance of milk. The 
infant suckles to live, the student reads the facts-and I speak 
now of what the writer of the opinion says are the facts-and 
learns their relationship to the law in order to survive at the law 
school and later .... The case method is uniquely conceived and 
designed to build a foundation for an understanding of the 
relationship of facts to law and for skillful handling of facts."14 
Weinstein's fallacy is that it is not the student but the lawyer in 
the case who had to sort out the immaterial. If the lawyer was 
at all skillful, immaterial facts would not appear in the case at 
all. True, the lawyers and judges may debate about the 
materiality of what remains, but that's not the whole of it. 
Weinstein comments: "For myself, if I were satisfied that our 
13Jack B. Weinstein, "The Teaching of Facts Skills in Courses 
That Are Presently in the Curriculum," 7 J of Legal Educ. 463, 464 
(1955). 
rts« at 464-465. 
14 
students were fully trained to know what to look for in the way 
oflaw, and, therefore, in the way of fact, it would be enough."15 
That's a pretty big "therefore." And, I believe, an illogical one. 
On the second point, he said: "Are our law schools doing 
any good in [the area of teaching how to shape the facts]? To 
ask the question is almost to answer it. Lives there a student so 
dense that he leaves the course in contracts without 
understanding that an agreement must have consideration or 
equivalent if it is to have the legal effect that, presumably, he 
wants it to have?"16 "What the student learns explicitly and 
implicitly is that he can control the facts in many cases to 
minimize the chances of litigation. "17 The fallacy here is that 
Weinstein stated an empirical proposition but, dare I say it?, 
offered neither evidence nor proof. He was content with a 
rhetorical flourish. At least in our era we might well wonder 
whether the student knows what the particular "thing" is that 
constitutes "legal consideration." Sure, the student knows the 
rule, and that's all that Weinstein points to. He avoids the issue 
of whether one party's muttered "I'll try to raise the money" 
amounts to a binding commitment. The issue for us isn't 
whether the student knows that the abstraction "consideration" 
is required to cause a legal effect but whether the student 
recognizes the abstraction in the flesh amidst a jumble of bones. 
On the third point, he said: "What concerns [many 
teachers] is the evidence of the facts. Here, as in Plato's image 
of the cave, we deal not with the facts, but with the shadows 
and reflections of the real world. The problem is how to catch 
the few distorted rays oflight available and focus them for the 
better education of courts and juries. "18 We might add that such 
a focus is needed not just for courts and juries, but for all those 
15 Ibid. at 465. 
17 Ibid. at 466. 
18Id. 
affected by the decisions for action for which a client seeks the 
lawyer's help. Weinstein says that this teaching is already being 
done, in civil procedure and evidence courses (and even in torts 
and contracts). He provides a long list of rhetorical questions, 
his answers to which are evidently quite different from mine. 
He asks, for example, "[w]hat does Hickman v. Taylor and its 
progeny mean to a student ifhe has no inkling of investigative 
procedure in large corporations and small?"19 Exactly, I say. We 
have no way of knowing whether much of what we teach means 
anything at all. Furthermore, as the rules have exploded in 
number we spend more and more time on that explosion and 
less and less, I venture to guess, on the underlying issues. 
Now professors may think that they are spending time on 
fact analysis. But in a candid moment they would likely say that 
the time is mostly by ipiplication. And they can have no 
assurance that the implications are being learned. After all, if 
implicit time is sufficient, why not spend that time implicitly on 
the rules, and explicitly on something else? Why not just 
assume knowledge of the rule and ask how a particular problem 
would come out? We don't because we believe that explicit 
discussion is imperative. No less should we be spending time 
explicitly discussing the nature of the facts that constitute the 
. legal problem and its solution. 
Weinstein says "to a large extent the burden of teaching the 
use of facts on trial is ... on the evidence course. Much of the 
detail is adverted to during the course. But it is quite true that 
the evidence teacher does not purport to teach the art of 
advocacy; rather, he emphasizes the rules and some of their psy- 
chological, legal, and social geneses and implications. An alert 
student will, however, undoubtedly get a good deal of practical 
insight from such traditional discussions. "20 Why does the 
student have to be alert? What about those who are not alert? 
Weinstein wrote of an evidence exam he gave "which 
19 Ibid. at 468. 
20Jbid. at 469 (emphasis added). 
consisted of the rambling story told by a client who had been 
injured in an automobile accident." He "asked the class to 
outline its investigative steps and the impact of the rules of evi- 
dence on the way it would prepare for trial and present the 
evidence expected to be revealed by such investigation. The 
answers showed a surprising carryover into the practical 
world. "21 Apparently, not even Weinstein expected the carry- 
over. Just what is it that we are afraid of that precludes law 
schools from delivering instruction on these issues explicitly? 
A single course may not make a difference. But a single 
course conjoined with a reorientation of other courses might 
well. My proposal is, I suggest, the exact parallel to our current 
experience with the teaching of writing. Writing was once, 
perhaps, supposed to have been taught in the regular courses, or 
at least absorbed in them. That didn't work, and almost every 
law school today has a formal first-year course in writing and 
research. But we are also hearing calls for "writing across the 
curriculum"; a single writing course is not enough. For the same 
reason, we need "facts across the curriculum," as well as a facts 
course. Weinstein asked that those who advocate the teaching 
of facts "continue their earnest efforts to educate the teachers of 
the usual substantive and procedural courses."22 We need both, 
and it is the writing professionals who might best be employed 
in the task. 
I hope readers will join me in this endeavor. We need now 
a lively discussion about ways and means. What new course 
might address the art of the fact? What techniques and 
problems and readings can spread the inquiry across all the 
courses that law schools offer? How can we initiate the 
movement toward facts? 
21Id. (emphasis added). 
=tu: at 471. 
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THEARTOFTHEFACT 
by 
Jethro K. Lieberman 
Every lawyer must learn to uncover, 
assess, and draw inference from facts, 
and then assemble them into a compel- 
ling narrative. Yet the law schools 
habitually fail to instruct their students 
in the art of the fact. This lecture is a 
plea to rethink this signal failure. 
